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Abstract
Causal graph discovery refers to the process of discovering causal relation graphs
from purely observational data. Like other statistical data, a causal graph might
leak sensitive information about participants in the dataset. In this paper, we
present a differentially private causal graph discovery algorithm, Priv-PC, which
improves both utility and running time compared to the state-of-the-art. The de-
sign of Priv-PC follows a novel paradigm called sieve-and-examine which
uses a small amount of privacy budget to filter out “insignificant” queries, and
leverages the remaining budget to obtain highly accurate answers for the “sig-
nificant” queries. We also conducted the first sensitivity analysis for conditional
independence tests including conditional Kendall’s τ and conditional Spearman’s
ρ. We evaluated Priv-PC on 4 public datasets and compared with the state-of-
the-art. The results show that Priv-PC achieves 10.61 to 32.85 times speedup
and better utility.
1 Introduction
Causal graph discovery refers to the process of discovering causal relation graphs from purely ob-
servational data. Causal graph discovery has seen wide deployment in areas like genomics, ecology,
epidemiology, space physics, clinical medicine, and neuroscience. The PC algorithm [27] is one of
the most popular causal discovery algorithms. It is comprised of a series of independence tests like
Spearman’s ρ [26], Kendall’s τ [12], G-test [18] or χ2-test [19]. The algorithm starts by connecting
all variables in the graph. If an independence test indicates that two variables are independent, the
edge between the two variables will be removed from the causal graph. The process will continue
until the edges between independent variables are totally removed.
Like other statistical data, a causal graph can leak information about participants in the dataset.
For instance, Genome-Wide Association Studies involve finding causal relations between Single
Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs) and diseases. In this case, a causal link between a specific SNP
and a disease may indicate the participation of a minority patient. However, the problem of effective
causal graph discovery with differential privacy remains largely unsolved.
State-of-the-art. The most straightforward solution is to perturb all the independence tests in the
PC algorithm with calibrated noise such as Laplace or Gaussian noise [7]. However, as pointed out
in [30], the numerous independence tests incur too much noise to output meaningful causal graphs.
Even tight composition techniques based on Re´nyi differential privacy [1, 20, 29] cannot address
the issue. The state-of-the-art solution to differentially private causal graph discovery is EM-PC [30],
a modification of the PC algorithm which uses the exponential mechanism to guarantee differential
privacy. Instead of perturbing each independence test with noise, EM-PC randomly selects how
many and which edges to delete using the exponential mechanism. In this way, EM-PC manages to
achieve a relative balance between utility and privacy. However, EM-PC has two severe defects. First,
EM-PC suffers from extremely slow computation because: 1) many independence tests which should
have been pruned have to be computed because the exponential mechanism can only deal with off-
line queries; 2) the utility function used in applying the exponential mechanism is computationally
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intensive. In fact, the computation overhead of the utility score is so large that the implementation
from the original paper [30] uses a greedy search to approximate the solution presented in the paper.
It is unclear whether the differential privacy still holds given this compromise. Second, EM-PC also
suffers from low utility because it changes the intrinsic workflow of the PC algorithm. Concretely,
EM-PC explicitly decides how many edges to delete while PC makes this decision in an on-line
fashion. Thus, EM-PC does not converge to the PC algorithm and cannot achieve perfect accuracy
even with substantial privacy budget.
Proposed solution. In this paper, we proposed Priv-PC, a differentially private causal graph
discovery algorithm with much less running time and better result utility compared to EM-PC.
The design of Priv-PC follows a novel paradigm called sieve-and-examine. Intuitively,
sieve-and-examine spends a small amount of privacy budget to filter out “insignificant” queries
and answers the rest of queries carefully with substantial privacy budget. The proof that Priv-PC is
differentially private is straightforward. The challenge is to understandwhy it also gives less running
time and better utility.
Sieve-and-examine, as the name indicates, comprises two sub-processes executing alternately:
sieve and examine. In the context of causal graph discovery, the sieve process uses sub-sampled
sparse vector technique [7, 2] to filter out variable pairs unlikely to be independent with a little
privacy budget. Then the examine process uses Laplace mechanism [7] to carefully check the
remaining variable pairs and decide whether they are really independent with substantial privacy
budget.
We choose sparse vector technique for its nice properties. First, sparse vector technique can answer
a large number of threshold queries but only pay privacy cost for those whose output is above the
threshold1. Fortunately, in causal graph discovery, only a few independence tests will yield results
above the threshold so with sparse vector technique, we can save much privacy cost. Second, sparse
vector technique can deal with online queries, so redundant independence tests can be pruned adap-
tively once their target edge is removed due to a previous independence test. Thus, with sparse vector
technique, we can get rid of the unnecessary independence tests in EM-PC and significantly acceler-
ate private causal discovery. We propose to further accelerate the execution and reduce privacy cost
by augmenting the sparse vector technique using sub-sampling without replacement [2].
However, sparse vector technique is known for its poor utility [17], which raises concern
about the accuracy of sieve-and-examine. Actually, there exist two types of errors in
sieve-and-examine. Type I error refers to mistakenly filtering out truly independent pairs. Type
II error refers to the failure to filter out variable pairs that are not independent. To reduce the errors,
we take a two-step approach. First, we suppress type I error by tweaking the threshold lower so the
noise is more unlikely to flip over the output from independence to the opposite. The tweak, on the
other hand, will increase the number of type II errors. Fortunately, type II errors can be corrected
by the examine process with a high probability. Furthermore, the threshold tweak typically only
increases type II errors slightly because a meaningful threshold should be far away from the clusters
of both independent pairs and dependent pairs.
Independence tests in Priv-PC. The noise magnitude in Priv-PC grows proportionally to the
sensitivity of the independence test (Section 2.1). Thus, to obtain an appropriate noise level, we
conducted rigorous sensitivity analysis for commonly used conditional independence tests including
conditional Kendall’s τ [14, 28] and conditional Spearman’s ρ [28] (Appendix D, E). We finally
chose Kendall’s τ in Priv-PC because of its small sensitivity. It also remains an interesting open
question how to integrate independence tests with infinite sensitivity such as G-test [18] or χ2-
test [19] in Priv-PC (Appendix F).
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we review necessary background knowledge about differential privacy and causal
graph discovery.
1Sparse vector technique can also only pay for queries below the threshold. For clarity, we only focus on
the above-threshold queries throughout the paper.
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2.1 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy, formally introduced by Dwork et al. [6] has seen rapid development during the
past decade and is accepted as the golden standard for private analysis.
Definition 1 ((ǫ, δ)-differential privacy). A (randomized) algorithm A with input domain D and
output range R is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if ∀ neighboring datasets D,D′ ∈ D, and ∀S ⊆ R,
we have that:
P[A(D) ∈ S] ≤ eǫP[A(D′) ∈ S] + δ
If δ = 0, it is called ǫ-differential privacy or pure differential privacy.
Intuitively, the definition requires a differentially private algorithm to produce similar outputs on
similar inputs. A common approach to achieving differential privacy is to perturb the output with
noise. The noise is carefully calibrated to appropriately mask the maximum difference of the output
defined as sensitivity.
Definition 2 (ℓk-sensitivity). The ℓk-sensitivity of a function f : D →R is:
∆f = max
x,y∈D,‖x−y‖=1
‖f(x)− f(y)‖k
Since all the independence tests in this paper output scalars, we omit the used norm and refer to the
value as sensitivity uniformly.
Composability is an important property of differential privacy. If several mechanisms are differen-
tially private, so is their composition. The privacy parameters of the composed mechanism can be
derived using standard composition theorem like advanced composition [7] and moments accoun-
tant [1]. The sparse vector technique [7] can be viewed as a special case for composition because it
can answer a large number of threshold queries while only paying privacy cost for queries above the
threshold. We refer the interested readers to Appendix B for more details.
2.2 Causal Graph Discovery
In statistics, causal graphs are directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) used to encode assumptions about
the data-generating process, which are formally defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Causal Graph). A causal graph G is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) represented by a
vertex set V = {v1, v2, · · · , vk} and an edge set E ⊆ V × V . Adj(G, vi) represents the adjacent
set of node vi in graph G. The skeleton of a DAG is the undirected version of the graph.
Causal graph discovery refers to the process of discovering causal graphs under an observed distri-
bution such as a dataset. The output of a causal graph discovery algorithm is a completed, partially
directed acyclic graph (CPDAG) because the directions of some edges cannot be determined only
based on the observational distribution.
There exist a variety of causal graph discovery algorithms and the PC algorithm is one of the most
popular ones. The first step in the PC algorithm is to find the skeleton of the causal graph using
conditional independence tests. Then the edges are directed based on some auxiliary information
from the independence tests to obtain CPDAG. Because the second step does not touch the data, we
only focus on the first step given the post-processing theorem [7] in differential privacy. The details
of the PC algorithm is introduced in Section 3.2 and Appendix A.
2.3 Conditional Independence Test
Conditional independence test is an important building block in many causal discovery algorithms. It
is used to test whether two random variables are independent conditional on another set of variables.
Definition 4 (Conditional independence test). A conditional independence test f : V × V × 2V ×
D → {0, 1} decides whether variable i 6= j ∈ V are independent conditional on another set of
variables k ⊆ V, i, j /∈ k. f is composed of a dependence score s : V × V × 2V ×D → R and a
threshold T ∈ R.
f(D) =
{
0, s(D) ≤ T
1, s(D) > T
, where 1 represents “independent” and 0 represents “not independent”. f is called |k|-order
conditional independence test where |k| is the size of the conditional set.
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Commonly used independence tests include Spearman’s ρ, Kendall’s τ , G-test and χ2-test. Note that
some independence tests like Kendall’s τ output 1when the dependence score is below the threshold.
However, for clarity, we assume all the independence tests output 1 when the dependence score is
above the threshold without loss of generality. In this paper, we focus on Kendall’s τ because of its
small sensitivity (Section 3.3).
3 Differentially Private Causal Graph Discovery
In this section, we proposed Priv-PC to effectively discover causal graphs following
sieve-and-examine paradigm. Concretely, Priv-PC leverages the sieve process to sift out vari-
able pairs unlikely to independent using a little privacy cost and then carefully examines the re-
maining ones with substantial privacy budget. We first introduce sieve-and-examinemechanism
and then demonstrate how to apply sieve-and-examine to the PC algorithm to obtain Priv-PC. At
last, we bridge sieve-and-examine and Priv-PC by providing sensitivity analysis for Kendall’s
τ .
3.1 Sieve-and-examine Mechanism
Most causal graph discovery algorithms like the PC algorithm need to answer many independence
tests – too many to obtain an acceptable privacy guarantee using independent perturbation mech-
anisms like Laplace mechanism [7]. EM-PC is the first step towards reconciling the contradiction
between utility and privacy in private causal discovery. However, EM-PC suffers from extremely slow
running time because it additionally runs a large number of independence tests that should have been
pruned. A straightforward solution is to replace the exponential mechanism [7] with the sparse vec-
tor technique [7, 17]. Sparse vector technique allows adaptive queries so unnecessary independence
tests can be pruned early. Besides, the privacy cost of sparse vector technique only degrades with
the number of queries above the threshold. Fortunately, only a few independence tests in causal
discovery yield values above the threshold so the sparse vector technique can also save considerable
privacy budget in causal discovery. However, sparse vector technique suffers from low accuracy as
pointed out in [17], which is not acceptable in many use cases such as medical or financial analysis.
To address the issue, we propose a novel paradigm called sieve-and-examine which alternately
executes sub-sampled sparse vector technique and output perturbation. Intuitively, the sieve pro-
cess uses sub-sampled sparse vector technique to filter out independence tests unlikely to be above
the threshold with small privacy budget. Then the left queries are examined carefully with substan-
tial privacy budget using output perturbation.
One-off sieve-and-examine. For simplicity, we first introduce one-off sieve-and-examine
shown in Algorithm 1, a simplified version of sieve-and-examine that halts after seeing one
query above the threshold. We prove that one-off sieve-and-examine is ǫ-differentially private.
The result can be generalized to multiple above-threshold queries using composition theorem.
Algorithm 1: One-off sieve-and-examine mechanism.
Input: D: dataset, {fi}: queries, T : threshold, t: threshold tweak,m: subset size, ǫ: privacy
parameters,∆: sensitivity of f
1 . Function Sieve and examine(D, {fi}, T, t,m, ǫ,∆):
2 D′ $← D, n = |D|,m = |D′|;
3 Let ǫ′ = ln( nm (e
ǫ/2 − 1) + 1);
4 Let Tˆ = T − t+ Lap(2∆ǫ′ );
5 for Each query i do
6 if fi(D′) + Lap(4∆ǫ′ ) ≥ Tˆ then
7 Let k = i;
8 Break;
9 if fk(D) + Lap(2∆ǫ ) ≥ T then Output k ;
10 else Output⊥;
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 is ǫ-differentially private.
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Proof Sketch. We separately prove that sieve and examine are both ǫ/2-differentially private. The
main body of sieve is a sparse vector technique with ǫ′ = ln( nm (e
ǫ/2 − 1) + 1) privacy cost.
Sub-sampling reduces the cost to ǫ/2 following Theorem 9 from [2]. Examine process is a ǫ/2-
differentially private Laplace mechanism. Thus, sieve-and-examine is ǫ-differentially private
using composition theorem.
Result Utility. The differential privacy proof is straightforward. The challenge will be to under-
stand when it also gives utility. Thus, we bound the probability of type I error and type II error in
Algorithm 1 separately and provide the proof in Appendix C.
Theorem 2 (Error bound).
• (Type I error) Let Eα1 denotes the event that Algorithm 1 filters out f(D) ≥ T + α.
P[Eα1 ] ≤ exp(−
ǫ′(α+ t)
6∆
)− 1
4
exp(− ǫ
′(α+ t)
3∆
)
.• (Type II error) Let Eα2 denotes the event that Algorithm 1 fails to filter out f(D) ≤ T − α.
If α ≥ t, then
P[Eα2 ] ≤ exp(−
12ǫα+ ǫ′(α− t)
6∆
)− 1
4
exp(−6ǫα+ ǫ
′(α− t)
3∆
)
.
Intuitively, theorem 2 bounds the probability of errors conditional on the distance from the depen-
dence score to the threshold. An interesting observation is the tweak on the threshold t decreases the
probability of type I errors and increases the probability of type II errors at the same time. Because
each type II error increases the privacy cost by ǫ, the question is “will the increment of type II errors
add too much privacy cost?” Fortunately, the answer is “no” because the increment of type II errors
also depends on the distribution of dependence scores. Generally the empirical distribution of an
independence score is a twin-peak curve and the threshold locates in the middle valley. In this case,
the threshold tweak only slightly increases the number of type II errors because most dependence
scores are far from the threshold2.
3.2 Priv-PC Algorithm
In this section, we demonstrate how to apply sieve-and-examine to PC algorithm to obtain
Priv-PC. We first give an overview of Priv-PC. Then we discuss how to optimize the sub-sampling
rate in Priv-PC.
Priv-PC algorithm. The complete pseudo-code for Priv-PC is shown in Algorithm 2. Priv-PC
follows the same workflow as the PC algorithm. It starts from a complete undirected graph (line
1) and gradually increases the order of the independence tests (line 6, 17). Within a fixed order,
Priv-PC traverse all the variable pairs with large enough adjacent set (line 8). It selects the con-
ditional variables from the adjacent set (line 9-10) and then executes the conditional independence
test to decide whether the edge will be removed from the graph.
To achieve differential privacy, the conditional independence tests are augmented with
sieve-and-examine. Concretely, Priv-PC first sub-samples a subset D′ from D, derives pri-
vacy parameter for the sieve process and tweaks the threshold (line 3-5). Then, Priv-PC executes
the sieve process by adding noise to both the tweaked threshold (line 5) and the independence test
(line 11). Note that the noise parameters here are different from standard sieve-and-examine
(Algorithm 1) because the sensitivity for Kendall’s τ is dependent on the dataset size (Section 3.3).
Once an independence test on the sub-sampled dataset exceeds the threshold (line 11), the examine
process will run the independence test again on the complete dataset with substantial privacy bud-
get. If the result still exceeds the un-tweaked threshold (line 12), the edge is removed from the
graph (line 13). Then, the sub-sampled dataset and the threshold are refreshed for the next round of
sieve-and-examine (line 14-15).
2A complete explanation contains two parts. First, since most of the dependence scores are far from the
threshold, the threshold tweak does not directly change the test results for most queries. Second, because the
dependence scores are far from the threshold, the absolute increase of type II error probability is small. Thus,
the increment of type II errors is small.
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Algorithm 2: Priv-PC Algorithm with Kendall’s τ . The highlighted parts are different from PC
algorithm.
Input: V : vertex set, D: dataset, T : threshold, t: threshold tweak,m: subset size, ǫ: privacy
parameter,∆: sensitivity on the full dataset.
1 Function Priv PC(V,D, T, t,m, ǫ,∆):
2 G = complete graph on V, ord = 0
3 D′ $← D, n = |D|,m = |D′|
4 Let ǫ′ = ln( nm (e
ǫ/2 − 1) + 1)
5 Let Tˆ = T − t+ Lap(2
√
n∆√
mǫ′
)
6 while ∃ vi s.t. |Adj(G, vi)− vj | ≥ ord do
7 while ∃ edge (vi, vj) s.t. |Adj(G, vi)− vj | ≥ ord that has not been tested do
8 select edge (vi, vj) in G s.t. |Adj(G, vi)− vj | ≥ ord
9 while ∃ S ⊆ Adj(G, vi)− vj that has not been tested do
10 choose S ⊆ Adj(G, vi)− vj , |S| = ord
11 if τ(ij|S) +Lap(4
√
n∆√
mǫ′
) ≥ Tˆ then
12 if τ(ij|S) + Lap(2
√
n∆√
mǫ
) ≥ T then
13 delete (vi, vj) from G
14 D′ $← D, |D′| = m
15 Tˆ = T − t+ Lap(2∆ǫ′ )
16 break
17 ord = ord + 1
18 Output G, compute the total privacy cost (ǫtot, δtot) with advanced composition.
Optimize sub-sampling rate in Priv-PC. In Algorithm 2, we require the caller of the function
to explicitly give the size of the sub-sampling set. However, since the sensitivity of Kendall’s τ also
depends on the data size (Section 3.3), we can actually derive an optimal sub-sampling size which
adds the smallest noise under the same privacy guarantee. This requires to minimize the noise level√
n/m
ln( n
m
(exp(ǫ/2)−1)+1) . Although there is no explicit solution for the optimization problem, we can
obtain an approximate solution with numerical solver such as BFGS [22]. On the other hand, when
ǫ is small, the optimal sub-sampling size is also too small to yield meaningful independence test
results. Thus we take the optimal sub-sampling size by clipping the solution to range ( n20 , n).
3.3 Independence Tests in Priv-PC
The last missing piece is the sensitivity of the conditional independence test functions. We finally
choose conditional Kendall’s τ for its small sensitivity. Conditional Spearman’s ρ is another can-
didate but it can only be used on large datasets because of the large coefficient in its sensitivity
(Appendix E).
The sensitivity of Kendall’s τ is inversely proportional3 to the training set size as pointed out in [15].
However, in our scenario, the conditional version of Kendall’s τ is needed while [15] only gives the
sensitivity for non-conditional Kendall’s τ . In order to fill the gap, we derive the sensitivity of the
conditional Kendall’s τ , and leave the proof to Appendix D.
Theorem 3. (Sensitivity of conditional Kendall’s τ .) The sensitivity of conditional Kendall’s τ in
Definition 6 (Appendix D) is c1√
n
where n is the size of the input dataset and c1 is an explicit constant
approaching 9/2 when the dataset size grows.
4 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of Priv-PC by answering the following two questions.
1) How accurate is the result of Priv-PC? 2) How much running time does Priv-PC save?
3Note that this requires the size of the dataset to be public which is a common case.
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4.1 Experiment Setup
In order to answer the above questions, we selected 4 datasets. The detailed information about the
datasets is shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Datasets used in the evaluation.
Dataset # Features # Samples # Edges Type
Earthquake [13] 5 100K 4 Binary
Cancer [13] 5 100K 4 Binary
Asia [16] 8 100K 10 Binary
Survey [24] 6 100K 6 Discrete
To directly compare EM-PC and Priv-PC, we ran the two algorithms on the datasets with 21 different
privacy parameters and presented the results with accumulated privacy cost between 1 and 100.
Furthermore, to demonstrate the utility improvement due to sieve-and-examine, we also directly
applied sparse vector technique to PC algorithm (SVT-PC) and evaluated it under the same setting.
For each privacy parameter, we ran the three algorithms for 5 times and recorded the mean and
standard deviation of the utility of the output graph and the running time. Utility is measured in
terms of F1-score4. All the experiments were run on a Ubuntu18.04 LTS server with 32 AMD
Opteron(TM) Processor 6212 with 512GB RAM.
4.2 Utility
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Figure 1: F1-Score vs. Privacy Budget.
In the evaluation, Priv-PC achieves better utility than EM-PCwhen the privacy budget is reasonably
large as shown in Figure 1. Priv-PC always converges to perfect accuracy when privacy cost grows
while EM-PC does not. The reason is that Priv-PC converges to PC when privacy cost grows but
EM-PC does not because it contains a unique sub-routine to explicitly decide the number of edges
to delete. The sub-routine intrinsically inhibits the accuracy of EM-PC. On the other hand, EM-PC
achieves better utility under small privacy budget5 because the exponential mechanism has better
utility than the sparse vector technique under small privacy budget as pointed out in [17].
Compared with SVT-PC, Priv-PC always achieves much better utility (Figure 1). The huge im-
provement should be attributed to sieve-and-examinebecause it effectively suppresses type I and
type II errors in sparse vector technique 3.1. Second, because the sensitivity of Kendall’s τ is in-
versely proportional to the size of the input dataset, the noise is typically small when the dataset is
large. Thus, the noise does not severely harm the utility while preserving rigorous privacy.
For completeness, we also evaluated sub-sampled gaussian (SG) with moments accountant [1] as a
representative for tight composition theorem [29]. The results show that the utility is typically worse
than EM-PC and SVT-PC, not to mention Priv-PC.
4.3 Running Time
Priv-PC achieves 10.61 to 32.85 times speedup compared with EM-PC as shown in Table 2. The
improvement is due to two reasons. First, Priv-PC can deal with online queries while EM-PC cannot.
4 If a causal graph discovery outputs G = (V,E) and the ground truth is G′ = (V, E′). Then F1-score is
defined as: F1 = 2·Precision·Recall
Precision+Recall
, Precision = |E∩E
′|
|E|
,Recall = |E∩E
′|
|E′|
5The line for EM-PC is almost flat in Figure 1 because the rising segment appears under small privacy budget
out of the axis scope (approximately 0.01 ∼ 0.1 according to our evaluation).
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Table 2: Running time when privacy budget for each sieve-and-examine is 1.
Average Running Time EM-PC SVT Priv-PC Priv-PC w/o sub-sampling
Earthquake [13] 176.04s 3.38s 6.62s 11.01s
Cancer [13] 64.62s 2.94s 6.09s 10.83s
Asia [16] 531.80s 10.06s 16.19s 19.40s
Survey [24] 68.13s 1.21s 2.13s 5.12s
Thus, if an edge is removed due to a previous independence test, later tests on the same edge can
be skipped to avoid extra computation overhead. Second, in the sieve process, Priv-PC only
runs independence tests on a subset of the dataset which further accelerates the process. This also
explains why Priv-PC sometimes runs faster than SVT-PC.
To better understand how the two factors contribute to the speedup, we run Priv-PC without sub-
sampling under the same setting and include the results in Table 2. The results show that the first
factor provides 5.97 to 27.41 times speedup and sub-sampling provides 1.20 to 2.40 times speedup.
5 Related Work
Causal inference has a long history and there are several excellent overviews [23, 8] of this area.
In this section, we briefly introduce the related works in the two most relevant sub-areas: causal
discovery based on graph models and private causal inference.
Causal discovery based on graph models can be roughly classified into two categories. The first cat-
egory is constraint-based causal discovery. The PC algorithm [27] is the most well-known algorithm
in this category. It traverses all the edges and adjacent conditional sets in the causal graph and re-
moves the edge if the conditional independence test indicates that the edge connects two independent
variables. An important variation of the PC algorithm is the Fast Causal Inference (FCI) [27], which
tolerates latent confounders. The Greedy Equivalence Search (GES) [4] is another widely-used al-
gorithm in this category which starts with an empty graph and gradually adds edges. The second
category is based on functional causal models (FCM). A FCM represents the effect Y as a function
of the direct causes X and some noise: Y = f(X, ǫ; θ). In Linear, Non-Gaussian and Acyclic Model
(LiNGAM) [25], f is linear, and only one of ǫ and X can be Gaussian. In Post-Nonlinear Model
(PNL) [31, 32], Y = f2(f1(X) + ǫ). Additive Noise Model (ANM) [10] further constrains the
post-nonlinear transformation of PNL model.
Private causal discovery has a relatively short history. In 2013, Johnson et al. [11] studied dif-
ferentially private Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS). They used Laplace mechanism and
exponential mechanism to build specific queries of interest in GWAS. In 2015, Kusner et al. [15] an-
alyzed the sensitivity of several commonly used dependence scores on training and testing datasets,
and then applied Laplace mechanism to the ANM model. Xu et al. [30] proposed to apply expo-
nential mechanism to the PC algorithm. Another line of work focuses on private bayesian inference
including [5, 9, 3]. Their pioneering works are inspiring but lack novelty from differential privacy
side because they all directly leverage off-the-shelf differentially private mechanisms without any
modification.
6 Conclusion & Future Work
This paper takes an important step towards practical differentially private causal discovery. We
presented Priv-PC, a novel differentially private causal discovery algorithm with high accuracy and
short running time. We also performed an empirical study to demonstrate the advantages compared
with the state-of-the-art.
At the same time, we observe many challenges in differentially private causal discovery that existing
techniques are not capable of handling. For example, it is unclear how to reconcile independence
tests with infinite sensitivity such as G-test and χ2-test; it is unclear how to handle data type beyond
categorical data like numerical data. We consider all these problems as important future work in the
research agenda toward solving the private causal discovery problem.
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Potential Broader Impact
Priv-PC provides an approach to effectively discovering causal graphs from purely observational
data. It can be deployed in genomics, ecology, epidemiology, space physics, clinical medicine, and
neuroscience to release causal graph while preserving the privacy of the sensitive input data. At the
same time, Priv-PC should be used with carefully calibrated parameters to make sure the discovered
graph is accurate and preserves the privacy . Inappropriate parameters might lead to weak privacy
guarantee that does not provide strong protection against attacks such as inference attack.
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A Pseudo-code of PC Algorithm
For completeness, we provide the pseudo-code for the PC algorithm in Algorithm 3.
B Exponential Mechanism & Sparse Vector Technique
For completeness, we provide detailed description of exponential mechanism and exponential mech-
anism.
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Algorithm 3: PC Algorithm.
Input: V : vertex set, D: dataset, T : threshold
1 Function PC(V,D, T ):
2 G = complete graph on V, ord = 0
3 while ∃ vi s.t. |Adj(G, vi)− vj | ≥ ord do
4 while ∃ edge (vi, vj) s.t. |Adj(G, vi)− vj | ≥ ord that has not been tested do
5 select edge (vi, vj) in G s.t. |Adj(G, vi)− vj | ≥ ord
6 while ∃ S that has not been tested do
7 choose S ⊆ Adj(G, vi)− vj , |S| = ord
8 if indep test(ij|S) ≥ T then
9 remove (vi, vj) from G
10 break
11 ord = ord + 1
12 Output G
Exponential Mechanism. Exponential mechanism is designed for differentially private selection
from infinite output set. It computes an utility score for each candidate output and randomly selects
from the output candidates based on probability derived from the utility score. The pseudo-code for
exponential mechanism is shown in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4: Exponential Mechanism
Input: D: dataset, O: output set, u: 1-sensitive utility function, ǫ: privacy parameters.
1 Function EM(D, O, u, ǫ):
2 Initiate U as an empty lists
3 for o ∈ O do
4 Append u(D, o) to U
5 Randomly select o from O according to probability exp(ǫuo/2)∑
ui∈U
exp(ǫui/2)
.
Sparse Vector Technique. Sparse vector technique is a widely used differentially private mecha-
nism. It can answer a large number of queries while only paying privacy cost for a small portion of
them. The pseudo-code for sparse vector technique is shown in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5: Sparse Vector Technique.
Input: D: dataset, {fi}: 1-sensitive queries, T : threshold,
c: quota of above-threshold queries, (ǫ, δ): privacy parameters.
1 Function SVT(D, {fi}, T, c, ǫ, δ):
2 if δ = 0 then Let σ = 2cǫ else Let σ =
√
32c log 1
δ
ǫ
3 Let count = 0, Tˆcount = T + Lap(σ)
4 for Each query i do
5 Let ν = Lap(2σ)
6 if fi(D) + νi ≥ Tˆcount then
7 Output ai = ⊤
8 Let count = count + 1 Let Tˆcount = T + Lap(σ)
9 else Output ai = ⊥
10 if count≥ q then Halt
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C Proof for Error Bound
Theorem 4 (Type I error bound). Let Eα1 denotes the event that Algorithm 1 filters out f(D) ≥
T + α.
P[Eα1 ] ≤ exp(−
ǫ′(α + t)
6∆
)− 1
4
exp(− ǫ
′(α + t)
3∆
)
.
Proof. We want to upper bound the probability of Eα1 . Equally, we lower bound the probability of¬Eα1 by the probability that the noise on the threshold is smaller than 13 (t+ α) and the noise on the
query output is smaller than 23 (t + α). Because for Laplace noise, P[x ≥ w] = exp(−w/b), we
have
P[¬Eα1 ] ≥ (1 −
1
2
exp(− ǫ
′(α+ t)
6∆
))2 = 1− exp(− ǫ
′(α+ t)
6∆
) +
1
4
exp(− ǫ
′(α+ t)
3∆
)
. Thus,
P[Eα1 ] ≤ 1− P[¬Eα1 ] ≤ exp(−
ǫ′(α+ t)
6∆
)− 1
4
exp(− ǫ
′(α+ t)
3∆
)
Theorem 5 (Type II error bound). Let Eα2 denotes the event that Algorithm 1 fails to filter out
f(D) ≤ T − α. If α ≥ t, then
P[Eα2 ] ≤ exp(−
12ǫα+ ǫ′(α− t)
6∆
)− 1
4
exp(−6ǫα+ ǫ
′(α− t)
3∆
)
.
Proof. If f(D) is not filtered out, it needs to be missed by both sparse vector technique and the
Laplace mechanism. The probability bound for being missed by the sparse vector technique is
P[Eαsvt] ≤ exp(−
ǫ′(α− t)
6∆
)− 1
4
exp(− ǫ
′(α − t)
3∆
)
following similar proof path to theorem 4. The probability being missed by the Laplace mechanism
is bounded by
P[Eαlm] = exp(−
2ǫα
∆
)
. Thus,
P[Eα2 ] = P[E
α
svt] · P[Eαlm] ≤ (exp(−
ǫ′(α− t)
6∆
)− 1
4
exp(− ǫ
′(α− t)
3∆
)) · exp(−2ǫα
∆
)
= exp(−12ǫα+ ǫ
′(α− t)
6∆
)− 1
4
exp(−6ǫα+ ǫ
′(α− t)
3∆
)
D Sensitivity of Kendall’s τ
In this section, we derive the sensitivity of Kendall’s τ and its conditional version. We first give the
complete definition of Kendall’s τ and its conditional version.
Definition 5 (Kendall’s τ ). Let {(a1, b1), · · · , (an, bn)} denotes the observations. A pair of ob-
servation indices (i, j) are called concordant if ai > aj and bi > bj . Otherwise (i, j) is called
discordant. Kendall’s τ is defined as
τij :=
2|C −D|
n(n− 1)
where C is the number of concordant pairs andD is the number of discordant pairs.
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Kusner et al. [15] derive the sensitivity for unconditional Kendall’s τ when the neighboring relation
between datasets are constrained to replacement. The first step towards complete sensitivity analysis
for unconditional Kendall’s τ is to extend the neighboring relation to increment.
Theorem 6. Kendall’s τ is 2n−1 -sensitive.
Proof. When the neighboring datasets are defined by replacement, the proof is done in [15]. Now
we prove that the sensitivity bound generalizes to neighboring datasets defined by increment.
If we increment a dataset by one row, |C −D| can increase by at most n.
s(τij) ≤ |C −D|+ n1
2n(n+ 1)
− |C −D|1
2n(n− 1)
≤ |C −D|+ n1
2n(n− 1)
− |C −D|1
2n(n− 1)
≤ 2
n− 1
Theorem 7. If the conditional variables have k blocks, then conditional Kendall’s τ is cτ√
n−1 -
sensitive, where cτ is an explicit constant typically close to
9
2 .
Definition 6 (Conditional Kendall’s τ ). We omit the pair indices i, j and use τi to represent
Kendall’s τ in the ith block of the conditional variables. If there are k blocks in total, then con-
ditional Kendall’s τ is defined as
τ =
∑k
i=1 wiτi√∑k
j=1 wj
where wi =
9ni(ni−1)
2(2ni+5)
is the inverse of τi’s variance.
Proof. If the ith block contains ni observations, then s(τi) =
2
ni−1 .
Then we need to bound wi√∑
k
j=1 wj
and its sensitivity. Assuming ∀i ∈ [1, k], ni ≥ c1, then c2(ni −
1) ≤ wi ≤ 9(ni−1)4 for some explicit constants c2 = 9c12(2c1+5) . Thus
wi√∑k
j=1 wj
≤ 9(ni − 1)
4
√
c2(n− k)
and
s(
wi√∑k
j=1 wj
) ≤ w
′
i√∑
j 6=i wj + w
′
i
− wi√∑k
j=1 wj
≤ w
′
i − wi√∑k
j=1 wj
≤ 9
4
√
c2(n− k)
. Thus the complete sensitivity is bounded as follow.
s(τ) ≤ ( wi√∑k
j=1 wj
+s(
wi√∑k
j=1 wj
))(τi+s(τi))− wi√∑k
j=1 wj
τi ≤ 27
4
√
c2(n− k)
+
9
2c1
√
c2(n− k)
E Sensitivity of Spearman’s ρ
In this section, we derive the sensitivity of Spearman’s ρ and its conditional version. We first give
the complete definition of Spearman’s ρ and its conditional version.
Definition 7 (Spearman’s ρ). Let {(a1, b1), · · · , (an, bn)} denotes the observations. If we indepen-
dently sort the observations {a1, · · · , an} and {b1, · · · , bn} in ascending order. Let di represent the
distance between the order of ai and bi. Spearman’s ρ is defined as
ρ = |1− 6
∑n
i=1 d
2
i
n(n−1)
|
.
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Kusner et al. [15] derive the sensitivity for unconditional Spearman’s ρ when the neighboring re-
lation between datasets are constrained to replacement. The first step towards complete sensitivity
analysis for unconditional Spearman’s ρ is to extend the neighboring relation to increment.
Theorem 8. Spearman’s ρ is 30n -sensitive.
Proof. When the neighboring datasets are defined by replacement, the proof is done in [15]. Now
we prove that the sensitivity bound generalizes to neighboring datasets defined by increment. And
we denote the incremented observation with (an+1, bn+1). First, ∀i 6= n+ 1, di changes at most 2.
Thus d2i − (di − 2)2 ≤ 4(di − 1) ≤ 4(m− 2), because di is smaller thanm− 1. Besides, dn+1 is
at mostm. Therefore, the sensitivity of ρ si bounded by
s(ρ) ≤ 30m(m− 1)
m(m2 − 1) ≤
30
m
Definition 8 (Conditional Spearman’s ρ). We omit the pair indices i, j and use ρi to represent
Spearman’s ρ in the ith block of the conditional variables. If there are k blocks in total, then
conditional Spearman’s ρ is defined as
ρ =
∑k
i=1 wiρi√∑k
j=1 wj
where wi = ni − 1.
Theorem 9. Conditional Spearman’s ρ is
cρ
√
k√
n−k -sensitive, where cρ is an explicit constant typically
close to 31.
Proof. If the ith block contains ni observations, then s(ρi) =
30
ni
.
Then we need to bound wi√∑
k
j=1 wj
and its sensitivity.
wi√∑k
j=1 w
2
j
≤ ni − 1√
n− k
and
s(
wi√∑k
j=1 wj
) ≤ w
′
i√∑
j 6=i wj + w
′
i
− wi√∑k
j=1 wj
≤ w
′
i − wi√∑k
j=1 wj
≤ 1√
n− k
. Thus the complete sensitivity is bounded as follow.
s(ρ) ≤ ( wi√∑k
j=1 wj
+ s(
wi√∑k
j=1 wj
))(ρi + s(ρi))− wi√∑k
j=1 wj
ρi ≤ 31√
n− k +
30
c1
√
n− k
F Reconcile Sensitive Independence Test
As an attempt to reconcile independence tests with infinite sensitivity such as G-test or χ2-test in
Priv-PC, we use subsample-and-aggregateandmedian aggregationwith local sensitivity to stabilize
these independence tests.
Definition 9 (Subsample-and-aggregate [7]). Let f be the function of interest. In subsample-and-
aggregate, the input database is randomly partitioned into m blocks and f is computed exactly on
each block. The outcomes are then aggregated using a differentially private aggregation mechanism
such as trimmed mean.
In order to use subsample-and-aggregate, we clip the outcome of the independence test to a bounded
range and estimate the median by adding noise calibrated to the smooth sensitivity [21].
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Definition 10 (Median Aggregation with Local Sensitivity [21]). Let Smed(x) represent the smooth
sensitivity of the median of a given input x. Smed(x) can be β upper bounded by the following
formula in O(n log(n)).
Smed(x) = max
k=0,··· ,n
(e−kǫ · max
t=0,··· ,k+1
(xm+t − xm+t−k−1))
where m is the median index. Let Z be a random value taken from an (α, β)-admissible noise
probability density function, then med(x) + Smed(x)α · Z is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private where ǫ and
δ depends on α and β. For instance, the Laplace distribution p(z) = 12 · e−|z| is (ǫ/2, ǫ ln(1/δ)/2)-
admissible; the Gaussian distribution p(z) = 12π · e−z
2/2 is (ǫ/
√
ln(1/δ), ǫ/2 ln(1/δ))-admissible.
Algorithm 6: Reconciled Independence Tests.
Input: D: dataset,m: number of blocks, f : independence test function, T : threshold, ǫ, δ: privacy
parameters, Z: (α, β)-admissible distribution.
1 Function ReconciledIDT(D, f, T, ǫ, δ, Z):
2 Partition the dataset inm blocksD1, · · · , Dm.
3 Compute f(D1), · · · , f(Dm).
4 Let z ← Z .
5 Outputmed(f(D1), · · · , f(Dm)) + Smed(f(D1),··· ,f(Dm))α · z
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